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I.

Introduction

On July 14, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") published a concept release requesting public comment on various
problems with the U.S. corporate proxy system.
The SEC had not

* B.B.A., Economics Concentration, 2012, Gonzaga University; J.D. Candidate, 2015;
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. For their invaluable contributions to
this paper, the author gratefully acknowledges Henna Choi, Nick Costanza, and Marc Tran.
1. See generally Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No.
34-62495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No.
201340, 98 SEC Docket 3027, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Concept Release],
availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf.
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conducted a comprehensive review of this shareholder communication
infrastructure-which is responsible for over 600 billion voted shares in
more than 13,000 shareholder meetings each year-in nearly three decades.2
Among the myriad issues the SEC is seeking to address in the concept
release, this note focuses on one: the difficulty with which public
corporations (or "issuers") communicate with their beneficial owners.
Commentators, including corporate issuers, argue that recent developments
in corporate governance' require an infrastructure that better facilitates
direct communication with shareholders.
The shareholder franchise is a fundamental tenet of the corporate
business form.6 Shareholders elect directors annually and vote on certain
'fundamental' corporate transactions. 7 State corporate law contemplates a
direct share ownership system in which issuers can easily identify their
shareholders using a registered shareholder list.8

But since Congress

implemented the depository system for securities ownership and trading
(the "indirect holding system") in the 1970s,9 a company's shareholder list
says little about who holds the right to vote its shares.o What ultimately

2. Open Meeting Webcast: Wednesday, July 14, 2010, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/news/
openmeetings/2010/071410openmeeting.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
3. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *28 ("[T]he practice of holding securities in
fungible bulk has made it more difficult for issuers to identify their beneficial owners and to
communicate directly with them.").
4. One example of such recent developments is the so-called "say-on-pay" advisory voting
mandated under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
5. SPECIAL REPORT, THE OBO/NOBO DISTINCTION IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP,
COUNSEL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 17 (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter CII SPECIAL REPORT],

http://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/02_1810_obo-nobo-distinction-white_paper
.pdf (discussing the Business Round Table's reform proposals and the "fair assumption" that such
proposals reflect large public companies' perspective); see also Concept Release, supra note 1, at
*29 (listing the revisions to the proxy rules "to promote direct communication between issuers
and their beneficial owners").
6. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 682 (2007) ("[A] viable shareholder power to replace directors is important in our boardbased corporate governance system.").
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 242, 251, 271 (West 2015) (describing
shareholder voting rights).
8. See, e.g., id. § 219(a), (c) (defining the purpose of the stock ledger and responsibilities
of officers with regard to the stock ledger).
9. See David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy
System and Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 58 n.84 (2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1
(2010) (establishing a national system to administer clearance and settlement of securities
transactions).
10. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6 n.30 (defining "securities intermediaries" as
registered broker-dealers, banks, etc. "that in the ordinary course of business maintains securities
accounts for others in their capacity as such"); see also id. at *6 ("[T]here can be multiple layers
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emerged is the current U.S. corporate proxy system-a system in which
public companies communicate with shareholders using indirect,
inefficient, and expensive means. As the SEC noted, "[the proxy process]
involves a level of complexity not generally understood by those not
involved in the process."" And perhaps even those who are involved
struggle to fully understand. Yet, according to former SEC Chairperson
Mary Schapiro, "the proxy is often the principal means for shareholders
and public companies to communicate with one another, and for
shareholders to weigh-in on issues of importance to the corporation."1 2
Notwithstanding the indirect holding system's inherent barriers to
communication, technological limitations can no longer justify-as they
did when the SEC last undertook to seriously consider the issuecompanies' inability to communicate directly with shareholders.1 3 A
reformed proxy system that takes advantage of modem computing and
networking technologies would effectively shorten the distance between
issuers and shareholders, create cost and time savings for issuers (and
therefore shareholders), and simplify the communication process.
This note is organized as follows. Part II provides background on the
indirect holding system and the associated complexities of shareholder
communication. Part III outlines two proposed regimes submitted in response
to the SEC's request for comment, followed by Part IV, which analyzes the
potential merits of these proposals in terms of efficiency and promoting
direct shareholder communication. Part V analyzes the structure of the proxy
services industry. Finally, Part VI proposes a reformed communication
system that seeks to restore significance to the concept of issuer-maintained
shareholder lists without compromising key stakeholder interests.

of securities intermediaries leading to one beneficial owner. This potential for multiple tiers of
securities intermediaries presents a number of challenges in the distribution of proxy materials.").
11. Concept Release, supra note 1, at *4.
12. Open Meeting Webcast, supranote 2.
13. See Letter from Niels Holch, Exec. Dir., S'holder Comm'ns Coal., to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter SCC Letter], available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-206.pdf ("The securities industry and the service providers to
the industry have developed and now operate very sophisticated electronic networks, either in
real-time or over short intervals of time, that are designed for much more intricate functions than
the relatively simple data demands necessary for the distribution of proxy materials and direct
communications with beneficial owners.").
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II. Background
The intermediaries between today's corporate issuers and their
shareholders did not always exist. The indirect holding system's settlement
and clearance mechanisms create efficiencies in the securities trading
system.1 4 The efficiencies in trading, however, come at a price. The
mechanisms that make securities trading more efficient also make the
process by which companies communicate with shareholders less efficient."
State corporation law defines "shareholder" based on a company's
shareholder list, which contains the names of the company's registered
shareholders.1 6 Under state corporation law, the registered owners of a
company's registered shares have the right to vote at shareholder
meetings.17 In other words, where a company's shareholders deal in
registered shares, the company can easily identify its owners. The
shareholder list would show who owns company shares, how many shares
each shareholder owns, and each shareholder's contact information.' 8 But
investors in U.S. public companies today almost never deal in registered
shares.19

Congress mandated a 'depository system' for securities ownership and
trading in the early 1970s after it determined trading volumes had become
too large to efficiently sustain physical movements of securities
certificates. 2 0 Thus, rather than owning and trading registered shares,
investors now deal mostly in beneficial ownership, "an entitlement to the

14. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *28 (discussing the "broad consensus" that the
volume of securities trading in the U.S. requires "a centralized netting facility (i.e., [the National
Securities Clearance Corporation]) and a depository (i.e. [the Depository Trust Company])," as
well as the SEC's understanding that "this approach to clearance and settlement had produced
significant efficiencies, lower costs, and risk management advantages"); but cf Donald, supra
note 9, at 99 ("Regulators diligently focus on the safety and efficiency of securities settlement in
relation to the overall financial system, while historically ignoring its effects on corporate
governance and costs to issuers and security-holders."); see also id. at 61-76 (discussing the
shareholder communication system generally).
15. See id ("[The] complexity stems, in large part, from the nature of share ownership in
the United States, in which the vast majority of shares are held through securities intermediaries
such as broker-dealers or banks . . . . The use of some of these [intermediaries] . . . adds

complexity to the proxy system and makes it less transparent to shareholders and to issuers.").
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a), (c) (West 2015); see also Concept Release,
supra note 1, at *6 ("It is a relatively simple process for an issuer to send proxy materials to
registered owners because their names and addresses are listed in the issuer's records, which are
usually maintained by a transfer agent.").
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) ("The stock ledger shall be the only evidence
as to who are the stockholders entitled . . . to vote . . . at any meeting of stockholders.").

18. See, e.g., id. at § 219(a) (describing the contents of the stockholder list).
19. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6 ("The vast majority of shares [in the U.S.] are
held through securities intermediaries such as a broker-dealer or bank.").
20. See Donald, supra note 9, at 58 n.84; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010).
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rights associated with ownership of the [shares]." 2 1
Securities
intermediaries-and namely the Depository Trust Company (the "DTC")have thus become the registered shareholders for most of the publicly
traded shares in the U.S. 22 "Cede & Co.," the DTC's depository bank
nominee, is the name appearing on a company's stockholder list for these
indirectly owned shares.23
The advent of the indirect holding system presented issuers and the
SEC with new challenges. A company's registered shareholder list became
practically useless because, in most cases, it only led the company to a
securities intermediary (e.g., Cede & Co.). So, the indirect holding system
made identifying the company's beneficial owners for voting purposes
difficult. These new challenges spawned a demand for shareholder
communication services-or proxy services providers-that would allow
issuers to communicate with investors.2 4 For its part, the SEC patched
together a set of proxy rules, which now govern in large part
communications between issuers and their beneficial owners.25
A.

The Federal Proxy System

Today, issuers communicate with their shareholders almost exclusively
through middlemen, such as brokers, banks, and proxy service providers.2 6
The SEC adopted regulations like rules 14b-1 and 14b-22 1 to ensure
beneficial owners receive proxy materials and have the opportunity to vote.
Under these rules, issuers-as well as brokers and banks (or "nominees")
that hold securities on behalf of beneficial owners-have an obligation to
follow certain protocols in distributing proxy materials. 28
For example, an issuer wishing to solicit proxies for its annual meeting
must do so by first communicating with the DTC. 29 The DTC then
identifies for the issuer all of the "participants"-often banks and brokerdealers-that hold the issuer's shares in an intermediary capacity.30 The
DTC must also make an accounting of the number of shares in each
21. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6-9 (explaining the proxy distribution process
with respect to beneficial shareholders).
25. See generally David C. Donald, The Rise of the Indirect Holding System, Soc. Sci.
RESEARCH NETWORK 58 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1017206 (discussing the SEC's proxy rules).
26. Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1-.14b-2 (2015)
28. Id.
29. Id. § 240.14a-.13.
30. Concept Release, supra note 1, at *7.
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participant's account, and formally transfer to the participants the right to
vote the shares.31 The issuer then sends what is called a "search card" to
each of the identified participants to determine the extent of beneficial
ownership underlying the participants' respective holdings.32 Once the
search cards are distributed through the relevant intermediaries and
returned to the issuer, the issuer should have an estimate of the number of
shareholders entitled to vote and the number of proxy materials or notices it
needs to send.
An issuer can also request from an intermediary the contact
information for all of its shareholders, which then obligates the
intermediary to disclose the contact information for those shareholders who
do not object to such disclosure ("non-objecting beneficial owners" or
"NOBOs"). 3 4 So, only after receiving the requisite contact information
indirectly-often through several intermediaries-can an issuer even
theoretically 35 communicate "directly" with shareholders. And in any case,
an issuer cannot use the NOBO list to distribute proxy materials or solicit
shareholder votes without first notifying the pertinent intermediary brokers
and banks (i.e., holding the issuer's securities on behalf of beneficial
owners) that the issuer has "assumed responsibility" for sending the
materials to its NOBOs.36
Issuers therefore generally prefer to
communicate with beneficial owners using proxy service companies,
which, as one scholar put it, "feed off the difficulties issuers and
shareholders experience under the SEC regime."3
B.

The Proxy Services Industry

One of the most consequential aspects of the SEC's proxy rules is the
requirement that issuers reimburse nominees for all "reasonable expenses"
incurred in the complex proxy distribution process described above. 38 Selfregulatory organizations ("SROs")-such as the New York Stock

31.
proxy."
32.
33.
34.

Id. The device used to transfer voting rights to beneficial owners is called an "omnibus
Id
Id.
Id.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1. The distinction allowed by the SEC's proxy rules between

"objecting" and "non-objecting" beneficial owners is commonly referred to as the "OBO/NOBO"
distinction. See generally CII SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 5.

35.

Over halfof all shares of publicly traded companies in the U.S. are OBOs. CII SPECIAL

REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.

36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13(a)-(c).
37. Donald, supra note 9, at 62-63; see also Concept Release, supra note 1, at *6-9
(explaining the proxy distribution and proxy voting processes with respect to beneficial
owners, and the role of proxy service providers in facilitating those processes).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1-.14b-2.
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Exchange ("NYSE")-use fee schedules, approved by the SEC, which
define and determine the expenses nominees may reasonably incur.3 9 The
NYSE's fee schedule allows nominees to charge issuers the following: a
"base mailing or basic processing fee"; a "supplemental intermediary fees"
to compensate proxy service providers that "coordinate proxy distributions
for multiple nominees"; and an "incentive fee," which applies "when the
need to mail materials in paper format has been eliminated [by the nominee
or designee]."4 0 Issuers must also pay nominees, or a service provider
designated by a nominee, for compiling the list of beneficial owners to
whom the proxy materials must be distributed.4 1
According to one estimate, issuers pay about $200 million in aggregate
to communicate with their shareholders every year, not including the
amounts spent on printing and postage for nonelectronic proxy distributions.42
The actual amount is almost certainly more than $200 million, as 44% of
retail investors received their proxy materials in 2013 through the mail and
in "full paper" form.43 The printing and postage costs associated with this
delivery method are more than twice that of electronic methods.44
The fact that the proxy services market is a monopoly makes
shareholder communications even more expensive. Broker-dealers and
banks outsource essentially all proxy distribution work to a single proxy
services provider called Broadridge Financial Solutions ("Broadridge").4 5
Broadridge completely dominates the market with approximately 99%
market share.46 With its monopoly position, Broadridge bills and collects
from issuers the maximum amounts allowed by SRO fee schedules, such as
the NYSE's, for owner-list-compilation and other necessary shareholder
39. Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Amending NYSE Rules 451 and
465, Exchange Act Release No. 34-70720, File No. SR-NYSE-20B-07, at *2 (Oct. 18, 2013),
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2013/3 4-70720.pdf.
40. Id. at *3 (citing to NYSE Rules 451.90-95, 465.20-.25; NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 402.10).
41. Id. (citing to NYSE Rule 451,92).
42.

THE PROXY FEE ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW YORK STOCK

EXCHANGE 3 (2012) [hereinafter PFAC REPORT], http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/
societies/sifma corporateactions_section/pfac-final-report.pdf.
43.

BROADRIDGE

FIN.

SOLUTIONS,

2013

PROXY

SEASON

RECAP

5

[hereinafter

BROADRIDGE PROXY REPORT], http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwCProxy Pulse-Third-Edition.pdf (stating that 44% of proxy materials were distributed by full
paper package delivery in 2013).
44. PFAC REPORT, supra note 42, at 3.
45. Id. at 2.
46. See Letter from Thomas L. Montrone, Chairman and Member, Sec. Transfer Ass'n, to
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, SEC, at 3 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter STA Letter], available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-2.pdf ("Since at least 1997, Broadridge has
controlled 99% of the market for proxy communication services to [beneficial] accounts. There
has been virtually no competition in this market . . . .").
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communication services.47 Nominees and Broadridge have also developed
a mutually beneficial arrangement, under which Broadridge "remits" back
to the relevant nominees a portion of the fees it collects from issuers.48
Further, while issuers bear the economic burden of the fees, they have
no control over the terms that nominees "negotiate" with Broadridge.49
Thus, nominees have little, if any, incentive or opportunity to reduce the
costs to issuers in this system.o Broadridge's monopoly over the proxy
services industry contributes to the high costs of shareholder communication."
C.

Shareholder Communications' Growing Importance

The proxy rules and similar regulations related to corporate governance
have evolved in recent years with a trend toward increasing issuer
accountability to shareholders.S 2 Recent developments in the corporate
governance landscape generally-such as Dodd-Frank's so-called "say-onpay" voting,53 the growing use of shareholder proposals to influence
management, 54 and the elimination of uninstructed broker voting in
uncontested director elections 5 5-also
magnify the need for direct
shareholder communication methods.
As the Council of Institutional
Investors ("CII") predicted in a 2010 publication, "[r]ecent developments
in corporate governance will place more pressure on voting outcomes and
increase the need for both companies and shareholders to have an effective
and reliable framework for communications."
47. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at *24 ("It is our understanding that Broadridge
currently bills issuers, on behalf of its broker-dealer clients, the maximum fees allowed by NYSE
Rule 465.").
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.

51. See SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 17 ("Over the last 24 years, the cost of providing
these NOBO lists has been reduced substantially because of technological advances, but, as a
result of a lack of market forces, this NOBO rate has remained unchanged.").
52.

See SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002,

http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#df20l0 ("The Act mandated a number of reforms to
enhance corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures . . . and created the "Public

Company Accounting Oversight Board."); id, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

ProtectionAct of 2010, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtn #df2010 (previewing the reforms
to corporate governance, disclosure and transparency imposed by the law).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010).
54. CII SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
55.

See SEC, Say on Pay andGolden Parachute Votes, INVESTOR BULL. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://

investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-bulletins/say-pay-golden-parachute-votes#.UxzMMPRdUQ5.
56. CII SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 ("[G]iven the rise in the number of meaningful
and contested voting matters, companies have a more urgent need to communicate with
shareowners.); see also Concept Release, supra note 1, at *28.
57. CII SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 11 (describing the changes in corporate
governance, including "increase in proxy contests," "amended NYSE Rule 452; starting January
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Data from a Broadridge report on the 2013 proxy season may support
58
the CII's prediction.
For example, the report revealed a general increase
in shareholder support for companies' say-on-pay proposals compared to
the 2012 proxy season." Broadridge posited that this increased support
"may be attributable to the changes companies have made as a result of
[shareholders'] previous year's vote," as "[t]he companies most likely to
have revised their compensation practices were those that received less
than 70% support for their pay plans last year, nearly all of which changed
their approach in some way."60 Thus, say-on-pay voting appears to have
made a relatively significant impact on company behavior.
Broadridge's report also found that out of the 104 companies that failed
to get a majority support for say-on-pay proposals and 170 companies that
failed to get majority support for director proposals, 26 failed to get
majority support for both such proposals. 6 1 Based on these numbers,
Broadridge concluded that "[i]t's possible that when shareholders are
unhappy with a company's pay plan, they may express that dissatisfaction
in director voting." 62 Companies will therefore want to continue to pay
attention to shareholders' say-on-pay voting. The ability to pay even closer
attention to these potential shareholder concerns would certainly help.
Unfortunately, the current proxy system's structure is simply not
conducive to efficient communication between corporate issuers and
shareholders. As one scholar comically noted:
After the proxy rules were bent around the indirect holding system, the
process turned into a complex parlor game of pin the proxy on the
beneficiary ... the issuer plays blindfolded, and cannot know what lies
beyond the next wall in the intermediary pyramid before making an
inquiry-inquiry always precedes communication.63
The proxy system is ripe for broad reform.

1, 2010, it prohibits brokers from using their discretion to vote uninstructed customer shares in
uncontested direct elections," "adoption, mostly by big companies, of majority voting in
uncontested director elections," and "widespread use of shareowner proposals to effect
governance and other changes").
58. BROADRIDGE PROXY REPORT, supra note 43, at 4 (discussing say-on-pay approval rates
by shareholders). Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. Donald, supra note 9, at 67.
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III. Responses to the SEC's Request for Comment
Myriad stakeholders in the proxy system submitted comments in
response to the concept release's request.
The Shareholder
Communications Coalition 64 ("SCC"), for example, submitted several

comments to the SEC, advocating for certain reforms it believes would
increase competition for proxy services, lower proxy services costs to
issuers, and allow for more direct communications. 65 The SCC proposes
two discrete changes: first, that the NYSE be made responsible for creating
and overseeing a central "data aggregator" that compiles beneficial
ownership lists and provides the lists to issuers or their designated agents
on an at-cost basis; and second, that the SEC eliminate the rules allowing
shareholders to remain anonymous via the 0130/NOBO distinction.66
Siding with the SCC, the Securities Transfer Association 67 ("STA")
sponsored a study to support the asserted merits of the SCC's market
competition model.
The SCC's market competition model seeks to effectively disentangle
the two main functions that Broadridge performs in its capacity as the
proxy services provider. The first function is compiling beneficial owner
lists, without which shareholder communications are obviously impossible.
The second function is forwarding the actual communications, such as
proxy materials.6
The next step in the SCC's proposal would be to
regulate the first function by creating a central intermediary to collect
beneficial owner names, contact information and share positions, and
provide the owner lists to issuers or their designees on a strict at-cost

64. The Shareholder Communications Coalition ("SCC") is an organization whose members
include the Business Roundtable, the National Investor Relations Institute, and the Society of
Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals. About the Coalition, S'HOLDER COMM'NS
COAL., http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). The SCC
describes itself as "an advocacy organization dedicated to improving the ability of individual
investors to vote their shares and communicate with the publicly traded companies in which they
invest." S'HOLDER COMM'NS COAL. (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.shareholder coalition.com/
index.html. In its "individual" capacity, the Business Roundtable likewise urged the SEC to
eliminate the OBO/NOBO distinction, permit direct mailing of all communications, and to adopt
rules to allow beneficial owners to vote their shares directly. Letter from Steve Odland,
Chairman-Corporate Governance Task Force, Business Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
SEC, Re: Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Shareholder Communications (Apr. 12, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm.
65. See SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 22-24 (describing estimated cost savings and listing
the SCC's asserted reasons for eliminating the OBO/NOBO classification system).
66. See id. at 13, 15, 22-23 (explaining the SCC's proposed reforms to the proxy system).
67. The STA is "the professional association of transfer agents," representing "more than
150 registered transfer agents in the United States and Canada." Who is the STA?, SEC.
TRANSFER ASS'N, http://www.stai.org/who-is-the-sta.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
68. SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 12.
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The NYSE would first establish a special committee of
basis.69
"representatives of broker-dealers, banks, issuers, institutional investors,
individual investors, and other identified stakeholders" for the purpose of
selecting the data aggregator. 7 0 The committee would then enter into a
five-year service agreement with the selected data aggregator,7 1 and would
be responsible for overseeing the aggregator on an ongoing basis. 72 The
second market function-forwarding communications-would in turn be
left to the market. By eliminating the OBO/NOBO distinction, moreover,
the SCC holds that its proposal would allow issuers to communicate more
directly with shareholders than is currently possible.74
An analysis of the comments" submitted by other groups, companies,
and individuals is regrettably beyond the scope of this note. The SCC,
whose members include the Business Roundtable, the National Investor
Relations Institute and the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance
Professionals, 76 is, according to the CII, an "industry group reflecting
company, management and director interests."7 Thus, the intent of the
forthcoming discussion regarding the SCC's proposal is to analyze a
representative viewpoint. The key characteristics of the SCC's proposition
are discussed below with a critical eye toward the potential benefits to
shareholder communication in terms of efficiency and disintermediation.
IV. Analysis: Does the SCC's Proposal Help Companies
Communicate with Shareholders?
Outlined above, the SCC's proposed
Broadridge's owner-list-compilation function
forwarding function, and then regulate the
competition in the market for the latter. This
all, the SCC's proposal would improve
communication processes.

system seeks to separate
from the communicationformer so as to promote
section examines how, if at
the existing shareholder

69. Id.
70. Id. at 13 (proposing a competitive bidding process for selecting the data aggregator).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra note 98.
74. See SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 23-24 (listing the "disincentives for direct
communications" created by the OBO/NOBO classification system as a reason supporting the
system's elimination).
75. Comments on Concept Release on the US. Proxy System, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
cornments/s7-14-10/s71410.shtml (last modified Aug. 6, 2014) (showing over 300 entries since
the Concept Release's publication date).
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. CII SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing public companies' support for
comprehensive reforms that promote direct shareholder communication and lower the costs of
such communication).
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The SCC's Proposed System Fails to Disintermediate

Under the SCC's proposed system, issuers and shareholders would
communicate much like they do in the current system. Companies must
request a beneficial owner list from an intermediary (the data aggregator),
just as they currently must request beneficial owner lists from
Broadridge.78
The intermediary then compiles and produces the
beneficial owner list, just like Broadridge does, in exchange for a
regulated fee to be paid by the issuer.79
From a company's perspective, therefore, the SCC's proposal fails to
remove all but one of the current intermediary steps in shareholder
communication-the step associated with OBO communications. So, in
terms of facilitating direct communication, the SCC's proposal is
functionally equivalent to the SEC simply eliminating the OBO/NOBO
distinction from the current system and doing nothing else. Interestingly,
the SCC also noted in one of its letters to the SEC:
The securities industry and the service providers to the industry have
developed and now operate very sophisticated electronic networks, either
in real-time or over short intervals of time, that are designed for much
more intricate functions than the relatively simple data demands
necessary for the distribution of proxy materials and direct
communications with beneficial owners.

Why the SCC does not advocate for a reformed system that takes
advantage of the technological capabilities it appears to recognize is not
clear. Whatever the reason, the SCC's proposed system simply fails to
meaningfully disintermediate shareholder communications.
B.

Promoting Competition for Shareholder Communication Services May
Improve Efficiency

One of the asserted merits of the SCC's regulatory system-cost
savings-is based on the theory that the system would promote competition
among producers of shareholder communication services, causing the
prices of such services to fall.82 To bolster its cost-savings theory, the SCC

78. See supra Part I.B.
79. See supra Part III.
80. SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 16.
81. Id. at 12 ("[Shareholder communications] would become the responsibility of each
issuer, using a proxy distributor . . . of its own choosing, with fees established through free
market competition among multiple service providers.").
82. Id. at 22 (referring to the STA Survey, infra note 82, and stating that "[the] study
demonstrates that a transition to a model in which free market competition can establish fees for
proxy distribution results in significant cost savings to issuers . . .").
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cites to a survey conducted by the STA, which argues that a market-based
model for proxy services would in fact result in cost savings to issuers.8
Each participating transfer agent was given the same set of three actual
Broadridge invoices, representing three different levels of processing
volume.84 The STA's survey asked each of its six largest transfer agent
members what they would charge an issuer for the proxy services that
Broadridge currently performs for beneficial owner accounts.85 The survey
then asked the transfer agents to determine for each level "what their own
organization would charge to distribute materials to that number of
accounts using the rate cards they currently use for registered accounts." 8 6
Finally, the STA added to the price quotes provided by the transfer agents
an "estimated data aggregation fee from a central intermediary" of five
cents per account.87 The STA chose this methodology because it roughly
simulates the competitive market for beneficial shareholder communication
services that the SCC's proposal would theoretically create.88
The STA's transfer agent members provide shareholder
communication services for registered shareholder accounts, the prices of
which are "established by free market competition among service
providers." 89 Recall that the shareholder lists compiled by the data
aggregator would contain the contact information for all beneficial owners
shareholders-not just NOBOs. Thus, in the SCC's proposed system, the
job of a proxy service provider would become somewhat analogous to the
job of a proxy service provider for registered accounts.
The STA found that the prices set by the competitive transfer agents
were between 20.52% and 71.62% lower than the prices Broadridge
charged in its invoices, depending on the size of the job. 90 While the
probative value of the survey's results is certainly debatable,91 the survey at
83. See Letter from Sec. Transfer Ass'n, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 6, 8 (Oct. 19,
2010) [hereinafter STA Survey], available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410141.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 13 (stating that the six transfer agents surveyed "account for more than 90% of
transfer agent services provided to issuers for registered accounts").
86. Id.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3. In fact, Broadridge competes in the registered shareholder communication
services market. See Letter from Charles V. Callan, SVP Regulatory Affairs, Broadridge Fin.
Solutions, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, Re: Concept Release, at 23 (Oct. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter Compass Lexecon Study], available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1410/s71410-77.pdf.
90. STA Survey, supra note 83, at 14-19.
91. For example, it is questionable whether simply asking the transfer agents what they
would charge is a very meaningful exercise. Further, the survey does not discuss in any detail
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least serves as a starting point for the admittedly speculative exercise of
trying to estimate potential efficiencies in the form of cost savings (if any)
that would be created by increased market competition for shareholder
communication services.
Interestingly, Broadridge commissioned a study of its own ("Compass
Lexecon Study") to support its position. 92 Discussing its methodology,
Compass Lexecon noted that "Broadridge competes successfully in the
registered proxy services segment, so Broadridge's prices for registered
services can be expected to be representative of prices charged by transfer
agent rivals." 93 Thus, to demonstrate Broadridge's efficiency, Compass
Lexecon compared Broadridge's prices for registered shareholder
communication services to the price of Broadridge's beneficial shareholder
communication services. 94 Naturally, the study found in the end that the
prices Broadridge charges for beneficial shareholder communication
services "compare favorably" to similar services for registered shares. 95
The Compass Lexecon Study's data show that the per unit costs for
jobs-non-notice and access 9 6 -under 5000 pieces are about 123% more
for registered shareholder proxy services compared to those for beneficial
shareholder services.
The same comparison for notice and access jobs
reveals a 211% cost differential, likewise in favor of beneficial shareholder
services. 98 While it is not immediately clear from the study how the
intermediary steps associated with beneficial proxy processing create cost
savings, economies of scale principles9 9 suggest that the relative volume of
whether the transfer agents' processes for distributing registered shareholder materials would be
directly scalable for purposes of beneficial shareholder communication services. See id.
92. See Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, at 1 (presenting "findings of a study by
Compass Lexecon comparing the fees and costs of beneficial- and registered proxy delivery").
93. Id. at 33.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 46. This claim directly contradicts the SEC's findings in a 1976 study, which
found that "[tihe cost data indicate that the per unit cost of sending proxy materials to beneficial
owners through intermediaries is substantially higher than the per unit cost of sending these
materials directly to shareholders."
SEC, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICE OF RECORDING THE OWNERSHIP OF
SECURITIES IN THE RECORDS OF THE ISSUER IN OTHER THAN THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIAL

OWNER OF SUCH SECURITIES 25 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter STREET NAME STUDY],
availableat https://ia801700.us.archive.org/23/items/fsecO0unit/fsecOOunit.pdf.
96. "Notice and access" refers to issuers' option under the proxy rules to provide
shareholders with free, online access to proxy materials using a publicly accessible webpage, and
notice of such access, to satisfy the issuers' obligation to provide proxy materials to shareholders.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16.
97. Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, at 36, tbl. 7 ($11.60 versus $5.18).
98. Id at 39, tbl. 8 ($6.91 versus $2.22).
99. "Economies of scale" is a microeconomic concept or condition in which a producer
experiences an increase in output larger in proportion to any increases to her input, thereby
reducing her per-unit costs and long-run costs of production. This phenomenon is caused in part
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beneficial ownership,0 o combined with Broadridge's large market share,
has over time allowed Broadridge to decrease its per unit costs for
beneficial proxy services relative to registered proxy services.' 0
In other words, the cost differences between the two types of
processing jobs (beneficial versus registered) do not necessarily mean
Broadridge is more efficient than the competitive transfer agents in
performing proxy services generally are. The fact that Broadridge has
historically prossessed more beneficially owned pieces compared to
registered pieces would explain its lower relative per unit cost for
beneficial shareholder services.1 02 Moreover, unlike the STA survey,
Compass Lexecon's survey does not attempt to simulate the market
conditions that the SCC's proposal hypothesizes. Comparing the prices
of Broadridge's beneficial proxy processing services with those of its
registered proxy processing services-as the Compass Lexecon Study
does-is not a meaningful comparison.
Part 0 discussed the considerable expense public companies must bear
to communicate with their shareholders. Presumably, any reform that
reduces the costs associated with shareholder communication without
negatively affecting the availability or quality of such communication
would represent enhanced efficiency to the current system. In any case, the
SEC has gone on record stating its public policy position that "market
forces should ultimately determine competitive and reasonable rates of
reimbursement [for proxy services]." 0 3 Thus, to the extent it would

by growing firms'-and especially growing firms that are also large-"abilityto take advantage
of highly efficient mass production techniques . . . that ordinarily require large setup costs and
thus are economical only if they can be spread over a large number of units." ROGER A.
ARNOLD, EcONOMICS 427-28 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 8th ed. 2008).
100. According to Broadridge's internal data, "the average number of proxy pieces per
invoice was 8,450 for registered and 84,938 for beneficial." Compass Lexecon Study, supra note
89, at 33; see also Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, SEC,www.sec.gov/spotlight/
proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm ("Approximately 85% of exchange-traded securities are held
by securities intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and banks, on behalf of themselves or their
customers.").
101. Broadridge, in fact, supports the proposition that it has achieved economies of scale in
beneficial processing. See Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, at 9 ("Broadridge's systems,
technologies, and scale create numerous efficiencies and conveniences for corporate issuers and
other participants.").
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. Concept Release, supra note 1, at *25; see also Order Appproving Proposed Rule
Change and Regarding the Transmission of Proxy and Other Shareholder Communication
Material, Exchange Act Releasea No. 34-45644, 77 SEC Docket 594, 2002 WL 461345, at *6
(Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45644.htm ("The Commission
believes that permanent approval of the current proxy fee structure will permit the NYSE and
other interested parties to focus on a long-term solution that would allow market forces rather
than SRO rules to set rates.").
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increase competition for proxy services, the SCC's proposed reform stands
as an attractive course of action from the SEC's perspective.
V. Analysis: Why Not Cut Out the Middleman?
Briefly reiterating the discussion up to this point, the indirect holding
system means intermediary banks hold the vast majority of outstanding
registered shares while investors deal in beneficial ownership (i.e., a claim
to the rights associated with owning the underlying registered shares). A
company's registered shareholder list no longer tells the company who
holds the right to vote its shares. Consequently, an issuer seeking to make
contact with its shareholders must first request a shareholder list and
shareholder contact information from intermediaries.1 04
In terms of potential reform, the SCC's market competition model may
help to reduce communication costs for issuers. From a company's
perspective, however, the SCC's proposed system would differ from the
current system in just one material respect: companies would be able to
contact all their beneficial owners-not just NOBOs-based on the list the
data aggregator provides.' 05
Today's networking and computing
technology makes possible a more direct system than the SCC proposes.
If the goal is a more direct system and technology makes this possible,
one approach to reform could be to simply require intermediary brokers
and banks to disclose beneficial owner information directly to the relevant
issuers. So, why not cut out the intermediary shareholder list compiling
function entirely? The remainder of this part addresses the difficulty with
this approach. Examining the genesis of Broadridge's monopoly is an
instructive starting point.
A.

Compiling Beneficial Owner Lists Was a Naturally Monopolistic Function
As the SCC's proposed reform implies, the two related functions that
Broadridge performs -owner-list-compilation and proxy communication
services-need not be performed under the same roof. It would make no
difference (all other things being equal) whether Broadridge or another
capable entity performs proxy communication services for an issuer once
the list of beneficial owners is complete. The Compass Lexicon Study,
however, claims that "[w]ithout a standardized voting platform,
104. See generally supra Part II (discussing issuers' complex task of identifying and
communicating with shareholders within the indirect holding system).
105. SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 24. With the OBO/NOBO distinction nixed, issuers
would be able to use the beneficial owner list provided by the data aggregator for purposes of
proxy distribution, as well as other communications, which is not currently possible because of
the OBO/NOBO distinction.
106. See id. at 34-35.
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shareholders would be forced to deal with a variety of voting platforms . .
[which] could increase the cost to shareholders of corporate voting and
reduce participation."' 0 7 But is the proxy services industry really most
efficient with a just single service provider? Unsurprisingly, the story of
Broadridge's vertically integrated proxy services monopoly is not as simple
as the Compass Lexecon Study suggests. In fact, Broadridge's current
monopoly over the beneficial owner-list-compilation function was essentially
government created.10 8

A monopoly is considered a "natural monopoly" when the
monopolist's industry operates more efficiently with only one producer
than it does with many producers. 109 One of the hallmarks of such a
situation is extraordinarily large capital requirements, often in the form of
infrastructure.
The quintessential example of a natural monopoly is a
local public utilities provider."' To illustrate, consider a situation in which
several municipal water suppliers try to compete with one another in the
same locality. Assume further that they each use the same water source, a
government-owned reservoir, and that they are able to resist the
overwhelming temptation to collude.
This type of "pipe-to-pipe"
competition requires an inefficient duplication of the requisite
infrastructure.1 2 And due to the extraordinarily high capital requirements
in the form of pipes, pumps and other infrastructure, the firms' average
costs will only begin to decline over an extraordinarily large quantity of
output. Thus, if these companies compete for water service contracts in the
same city, the result is inefficiently high costs. It would be more efficient
to simply regulate a single service provider, thereby eliminating
redundancies in the infrastructure and spreading the costs of such
infrastructure over a larger quantity of output." 3
An analogous situation existed in the 1980s, when the SEC instructed
the NYSE to "develop and establish both an efficient means of furnishing
beneficial owner information to [issuers] and an appropriate schedule or

107. Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, at 4.
108. See Facilitating Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 34-21901,
Investment Company Act Release No. 14438, 32 SEC Docket 1038, 1985 WL 61467, at *2 (Mar.
28, 1985) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-21901] (discussing the SEC's decision to select an
intermediary to collect beneficial shareholder information from intermediaries).
109.

See, e.g., EDWARD ELGAR PUBL'G, INC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

VOLUME 9: REGULATION AND ECONOMICS 100-01 (R. J. Van Den Bergh et al. eds., 2d ed.
2012).
110. Id.

111.

Id.

112.
113.

Id. at 432.
Id.
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reimbursement."ll 4
Accordingly, the NYSE formed the Ad Hoc
Committee on Identification of Beneficial Owners ("Ad Hoc Committee")
"to resolve the cost issues and to develop a workable and effective system
that would be of maximum use to [issuers] and not burdensome to
brokers.""' One of the cost issues examined was the "start-up costs
associated with furnishing the beneficial owner information to [issuers]."" 6
The Ad Hoc Committee ultimately found that allowing brokers to
outsource the function of compiling comprehensive beneficial owner lists
to a single intermediarywould achieve economies of scale "by maximizing
cost savings while minimizing burdens on brokers," and would also ensure
that the lists were standardized and confidential.1'
The Ad Hoc Committee selected the Independent Election
Corporation of America ("IECA") to be the intermediary between issuers
and brokers in supplying lists of beneficial ownership positions." 8 A
company called Automatic Data Processing, which had recently entered the
proxy services business at that time, later bought IECA."l 9 Automatic Data
Processing eventually spun off its proxy processing business into what is
now Broadridge.1 20 In this way, Broadridge's monopoly-at least with
respect to beneficial owner list services-is less the result of bona fide
market forces, as Compass Lexecon suggests, than it is the result of
regulation.' 2
Nevertheless, this historical narrative demonstrates that the concerns
relating to the startup costs, economies of scale, standardization, and
confidentiality confined the Ad Hoc Committee's horizon of efficient
structures.1 22

114. See SEC Release No. 34-21901, supra note 108, *2 (discussing the decision to select
an intermediary to collect beneficial shareholder information from intermediaries).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id.; see also Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, attachment at 6.
119. See Compass Lexecon Study, supra note 89, attachment at 7 ("Broadridge, then part of
Automatic Data Processing ('ADP') entered the proxy services business in 1989 and in 1992
purchased IECA.").
120. Id.; see also SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 14 (discussing how "IECA was acquired in
1992 by the division of ADP that later became Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.").
121. See SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 14 ("The structure of the current proxy processing
system has been in place for the last 25 years, with the same entity providing these
services . . . .").
122. See SEC Release No. 34-21901, supra note 108, at *2 ("To make the system work and
to ensure that [companies] find the beneficial owner lists useful and meaningful, the Ad Hoc
Committee also determined that an intermediary was necessary.").
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Maintaining the OBO Classification Precludes Direct Intermediary
Disclosure

Given the economic and technological realities in the mid-1980s, the
Ad Hoc Committee determined that a single intermediary would most
efficiently perform the beneficial owner list compilation function. But
would the Ad Hoc Committee reach the same conclusion today? Does the
beneficial owner list compilation function still bear the earmarks of a
natural monopoly?
Prior to the Ad Hoc Committee, the SEC conducted a studyl 23 on the
indirect holding system, the purpose of which, in part, was to determine
"whether steps can be taken to facilitate communications between issuers
and the beneficial owners of the securities."l2 4 The study considered
several alternative approaches to shareholder communications within the
indirect holding system in light of "the strong desire of many issuers for
direct communications with their shareowners."l 2 5 One such alternative,
called "Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership for Purposes of Shareholder
Communications," would require brokers and banks to "disclose to issuers
the names of customers for whom the intermediaries act as custodian." 26
The mandatory-disclosure-by-intermediaries model found strong
support from "a substantial segment of the issuer community," but was
generally opposed by intermediaries, who "argued that disclosure would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of their customers' privacy."l 2 7 The
study ultimately concluded that:
[d]isclosure of the names of shareowners by intermediaries to issuers
would not interfere with those functions of the securities and banking
industries ...
It would, however, impose substantial recordkeeping
burdens on intermediaries and many issuers, and does not appear
feasible absent the development of a compatible industry-wide computer
system for the transmission of names and the development of a standard
28
format.1

This conclusion is, of course, very similar to the Ad Hoc Committee's
findings roughly ten years later.1 29

123.

STREET NAME STUDY, supra note 95.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at (iii) (attached Letter of Transmittal from Chairman Roderick Mills).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
See supra Part V.A.
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However, modem networking and computing technologies could easily
provide a "compatible industry-wide computer system for transmission" in
a reformed proxy system.1 30 Instituting a standardized format for beneficial
owner data would likewise be a nonissue in a modem context. 13' Today's
technological capabilities thus make possible a proxy system in which
securities intermediaries simply provide relevant beneficial ownership data
directly to issuers. That is, issuers could have a shareholder list akin to
state corporate law's registered shareholder list, which would allow issuers
to contact shareholders with relative ease and promote competition in the
market for ancillary proxy services.
But technology does not solve all the problems that the SEC and the
Ad Hoc Committee faced decades ago. For example, adopting this direct
disclosure system would likely still require brokers and other
intermediaries to incur higher costs in their efforts to comply with it (but,
of course, these potential costs may have shrunk over the years). And
perhaps more significantly, technological innovation has not changed the
fact that direct intermediary disclosure would raise confidentiality concerns
for shareholders. If issuers can directly contact shareholders using only the
information provided by intermediary brokers and banks, OBO anonymity
is simply no more. How else would issuers directly contact the beneficial
owners? Thus, cost considerations aside, technological breakthroughs over
the last thirty years do not obviate the need for an owner-list-compiling
intermediary if the OBO/NOBO distinction is to remain in place.1 3 2
VI. Proposal: Proxy.gov
This note proposes the following solution to the direct shareholder
communication problem. The SEC should adopt regulations requiring
retail brokers and banks to provide ownership positions and contact
information, including objecting beneficial owners, in a standardized
format to a central data server at the close of each trading day. The SEC
would be responsible for building and managing the server, much like its
existing EDGAR database.1 3 3
Each registered issuer is given login
130. See SCC Letter, supra note 13, at 16 ("The securities industry and the service providers
to the industry have developed and now operate very sophisticated electronic networks, either in
real-time or over short intervals of time, that are designed for much more intricate functions than
the relatively simple data demands necessary for the distribution of proxy materials and direct
communications with beneficial owners.").
131. Id
132. If the SEC decides that shareholders should no longer be able to classify themselves as
OBOs, then a truly direct system is possible, as described above, and should be implemented.
Until then, however, an intermediary is needed to perform the owner-list-compilation function.
133. EDGAR is the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. It is
essentially a publicly accessible database for reporting companies' filings. EDGAR, SEC,
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credentials to a secure portal integrated with the server for the purpose of
accessing the shareholder data. Shareholders could also be given access
credentials through their brokers, effectively allowing them to contact
fellow shareholders for the purpose of collective action.
The server-proxy.gov-in turn, operates as a transparent liaison for
shareholder communication. After receiving the data from intermediaries,
the portal presents the beneficial ownership positions as standardized data
entries, only identifying beneficial owners by name (or using any other
personal identifiers) where owners do not object. The server assigns OBO
positions a unique, non-personal identifier for each position held. And to
allow direct communication with OBOs and NOBOs alike, the server
functions as a messaging relay service-or messaging proxy, for lack of a
better term. The proxy messenger would operate using the same concept
that Craigslist.org's email relay system uses.134
Issuers (or a designated service provider) would therefore have the
ability to communicate directly with all of their beneficial owners, all while
maintaining OBOs' anonymity. By requiring these daily 'filings' from
brokers and banks, and by providing issuers with access to the gathered
information, the SEC would effectively restore significance to state
corporate law's registered shareholder list. Issuers would know their
shareholders-if not by name, then by an anonymous naming convention
invisibly linked to individual brokerage accounts-and would be able to
directly communicate with them.135

https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). The SEC
"phased in" EDGAR over a three-year period, ending in 1996, after which all public domestic
companies have been required to make many of their filings using EDGAR. See Important
Information About EDGAR, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2014). According to the SEC, "[EDGAR's] primary purpose is to increase the efficiency and
fairness of the securities market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by
accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and analysis of time-sensitive corporate
information filed with the agency." Id
134. For example, in February 2013, Craigslist (.org) began a two-way email relaying system
that allows anonymous email correspondence between its users, while allowing the users to still
use their native emailing service. Elizabeth Mott, How Does Craigslist Redirect Mail?,
OPPOSINGVIEWS.COM,
http://science.opposingviews.com/craigslist-redirect-mail-5214.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014). The system works simply by assigning email messages "a cloaked
address at 'reply.craigslist.org' instead of [the users'] actual address," and then forwarding the
communications to the appropriate recipients. Id; see also About Email-Relay, CRAIGSLIST,
http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/email-relay (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). Note, however, that
this system would require OBOs to agree, as a condition to OBO status, to receive only electronic
communications from issuers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7, -16 (2008)
135. Of course, the system would also require additional rules to avoid double counting of
shares, for example, if an individual shareholder owns shares of the same company through
multiple brokerage accounts.
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Further, entry into Broadridge's shareholder communication services
industry would no longer be insurmountable because issuers would control
the owner-list-compilation function-not Broadridge. As a result, issuers
would be free to choose the truly lowest cost and/or highest quality
provider of shareholder communication services. Perhaps some smaller
companies would choose to insource some of the shareholder
communication functions that it formerly had to outsource. Or perhaps
existing firms with the requisite capital and/or infrastructure would begin to
compete with Broadridge for service contracts. In any case, the most
optimal way to communicate would be a matter of issuer choice.
Potential critics of this system might argue that it would be very costly
to implement, and they would probably be right. The SEC would likely
need, for example, a grant from Congress to help finance the construction
of the server and user portal. Perhaps the SEC would likewise have to
increase some of its filing fees or take some other measures to be able to
maintain the system. Broker and bank intermediaries would ideally face
enough competition among one another to require that they absorb some of
the added costs from the continuous disclosure mandate. But even
assuming that happens, it is still not unreasonable to think that part of the
added costs would also be passed onto their customers (i.e., shareholders).
Even if short-run aggregate costs are increased, the proposed system
improves companies' ability to communicate with shareholders, and could
improve efficiency in the proxy services industry generally.13 6 Issuers
would have quick and easy access to a functional shareholder list at no
"direct" cost. And unlike the SCC's system, the system proposed by this
note leverages modem technology to remove as many intermediary barriers
to shareholder communications as possible, and does not require OBOs to
sacrifice their anonymity. Thus, the proposed system minimizes the
barriers to shareholder communications, as well as the impact on existing
stakeholder interests.

136.

See supra Part IV.
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VII. Conclusion
The SEC has failed to improve the processes by which public
companies and shareholders communicate for the past three decades. 3
While the indirect holding system increased efficiency in trading, it has
required issuers and shareholders to interact through a "proxy system" that
is immensely inefficient, burdensome, and distinct from the system
contemplated by state corporate law. Technological innovation should
eliminate the need to play "pin the proxy on the beneficiary." With many
potential courses of action before the SEC, this note proposes one that uses
modern technology to meaningfully disintermediate shareholder
communications. While perhaps not itself a simple process, this approach
could greatly simplify the communication process for public companies.

137. See, e.g, Donald, supra note 9, at 82 ("As the markets steadily evolve toward electronic,
uncertificated securities, it becomes increasingly unacceptable for corporate governance in
general, and the proxy system . .. to bear the heavy externalities of a securities settlement model
designed to avoid the transfer problems of paper certificates.").
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